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Transition from Civil War to Peace:  
The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique 
Ayokunu Adedokun 
 
Throughout the 1980s, Mozambique was often labelled as an unlikely candidate for 
sustainable peace and post-war democratization by international aid agencies and donor 
communities, with persuasive reasons. For one, Mozambique was officially the poorest country in 
the world, with the lowest GDP per capita contraction (averaging -7.7 percent per year), and 
extremely poor infrastructure and productive economic assets—both human and physical 
(Adedokun, 2016; Jones & Olken, 2005; Manning, 2002). For another, Mozambique lacked all 
the desirable pre-conditions usually held to be conducive to sustainable peace and democracy, 
including weak political institutions, non-functional state bureaucracy, low rule of law, no 
democratic experience, and low degree of civic culture (Adedokun, 2016; Manning, 2002). 
Finally, Mozambique was plagued by one of the most brutal civil wars in the world that lasted 
sixteen years (1977-1992), cost more than one million lives, and left nearly six million people 
displaced—that is, 4.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.5 million refugees 
(Miller & Ferris, 2015). 
Yet, since 4 October 1992, when the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in 
Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo), led by President Joaquim Chissano, 
and the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), led by Aphonso 
Dhlakama, the country has successfully undertaken three crucial transitions. These are: From war 
to peace; from one-party state to formal liberal democracy; and from state-centered economy to 
market economy. After the peace agreement, thousands of refugees returned to their home and 
thousands of ex-combatants were demilitarized. Post-civil war democratization, while not without 
challenges, has been relatively successful. Since 1994, Mozambique has conducted five 
presidential and parliamentary elections. All of them have been held on schedule, most recently 
on 15 October 2014. Mozambique’s post-conflict economy also grew at high rates, with GDP 
growth at levels averaging 7.5 percent per annum over 1994-2014, buoyed by high levels of 
foreign aid and private foreign investment (African Development Bank, 2015). 
Mozambique has made great leaps in terms of human development and well-being. For 
instance, infant mortality rates have declined from 175 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1975, to 
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about 70 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011. Between 1980 and 2013, Mozambique’s life 
expectancy at birth increased by 7.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.5 years, and 
expected years of schooling increased by 4.7 years (UNDP, 2014). This is a surprising 
development in many ways, considering Mozambique’s unfavorable initial conditions before, 
during, and shortly after the civil war. It is thus worth asking: How did Mozambique make the 
leap from violent conflict to “sustainable peace”? Put differently, what factors account for the 
successful transition from civil war to peace in Mozambique? 
Based on extensive primary research this paper scrutinizes some of the most prominent 
ideas that surround Mozambique’s trajectory—namely, that its peacebuilding endeavor has been a 
success (Manning, 2002; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & Zartman, 2008) based on the “end of the 
Cold War” (Berman, 1996), “drought” (Ohlson, Stedman, & Davies, 1994), “military stalemate” 
(Lloyd, 1995), “luck” (Vines, 1998; Hume, 1994), and heavy “donor support” (Ball & Barnes, 
2000; Manning & Malbrough, 2009). 
While refraining from wholly dismissing these accounts, I argue that Mozambique’s 
relative peace and stability since 1992 is largely due to three complementary factors: (1) local 
participation in, and local ownership of, the peace process; (2) the persistence of an “inclusive 
elite bargain”; and (3) credible and impartial international support through the United Nations. I 
shall focus my discussion in this paper on the last point. Namely, that credible and impartial 
international support through the United Nations contributed to Mozambique’s relative peace and 
stability. I am not the first to discover that the United Nations and the broader international 
community played a prominent, and perhaps determinant, role in the implementation of 
Mozambican peace process. Alden (1995), Stedman (1997), Manning (2002), and Bekoe (2008) 
have written on the same subject. However, the mechanisms and strategies adopted by the UN 
and the international community in Mozambique is yet to be fully explored in the literature. In 
this paper, I show that any assessment of the UN’s role and performance as well as that of the 
international community in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation 
and understanding of four causal mechanisms or instruments, namely: (1) Disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) before democratization strategy; (2) Humanitarian 
assistance; (3) political and electoral assistance; and (4) budget support. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: research methodology and design; a brief 
background on the causes of civil war in Mozambique: external vs. internal causes; legacies of the 
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war in Mozambique; peace initiatives in Mozambique; theoretical argument on why the United 
Nations and the broader international community is key to peacebuilding; the analysis of the four 
UN strategies that have contributed to sustainable peace in Mozambique; and a conclusion.  
Research Methodology and Design 
In order to investigate and empirically analyze the drivers of peace and stability in 
Mozambique, a qualitative case study-oriented research design was employed. Case studies, by 
definition, are rich, empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not evident (Yin, 2014; Gerring, 2016). By emphasizing the study of a phenomenon within its 
real-world context, the case study method favors the collection of data in natural settings, 
compared with relying on “derived” data (Bromley, 1986, p. 23). 
From the perspective of this research, the main strengths of a single case study are at least 
three-fold. First, I utilize a single qualitative case study design in order to focus on detailed, in-
depth data collection from multiple sources in a specific location, and for a particular group 
(Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2002), local and external actors in the Mozambique peacebuilding 
process. A single case study approach is particularly valuable for studying the pathways to 
sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique, as it allows me to pay particular attention to the 
historical context, which is important for an in-depth analysis. As Gerring (2007) explains, a 
single case study approach such as the one presented here can be more valuable than studies that 
pursue “fleeting knowledge” from a large number of contexts. “We gain better understanding of 
the whole by focusing on a key part” (p. 1). 
Second, the decision to apply a single qualitative case study approach was also based on 
the fact that while the rare process of “post-conflict success” as observed in Mozambique is not fit 
for statistical testing, it still holds great potential for qualitative analysis and theory development 
(George & Bennett, 2005). Third, and perhaps, the overarching reason for adopting the single 
case study approach is that it does not run the risk of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970, 
1984), which is a problem often confronted by statistical and large comparative studies that 
subject quite dissimilar cases to “one-size-fits-all” analytical frameworks. Moreover, the single 
case study approach allows for high levels of internal validity because it enables the researcher to 
identify and analyze those indicators that best capture the underlying theoretical concepts 
(Maxwell, 1992). 
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However, case studies also suffer from some weaknesses. These include bias in case 
selection, indeterminacy problems, and low external validity. In the context of this study, I 
address these single case study shortcomings by a focused logic of case selection and very 
specific objectives in the actual case study research. 
Sources of Data for this Study 
In order to conduct the research and gather the data required for this paper, I used several 
research tools. First, I engaged in an extensive desk study, reviewing the existing literature, and 
collecting secondary data on Mozambique peacebuilding from international development and 
non-governmental organizations in order to deepen my knowledge of the empirical terrain and to 
identify existing knowledge and analytical gaps. I complemented this basic research method with 
five months of fieldwork in Mozambique, during which time I utilized four methodological 
approaches: semi-structured interviews, archival research/process tracing, focus group discussions 
(FGDs), and non-participant observation. Though the four methods in themselves present an 
incomplete picture, the triangulation strategy (see Denzin, 1978, 2006) that I employed enabled 
me to construct a comprehensive account of the dynamics of peacebuilding in Mozambique since 
1992. First, I conducted 91 interviews with two groups of actors, broadly defined: (1) local and 
(2) international actors. The first group consisted of actors originating from within Mozambique 
who are knowledgeable about the project or played important roles in the pre-war, wartime, or 
post-war period. These included politicians and party leaders, civil servants, religious and 
traditional leaders, peace mediators, media practitioners, academics, and members of civil society 
organizations (CSOs). 
The second group consisted of international officials who have worked in Mozambique 
since the end of the war. These included staff of international organizations such as the United 
Nations or donor agencies, including Department for International Development (DfID), United 
States via its Agency for International Development (USAID), “Swedish International 
Development Agency” (SIDA); as well as international NGOs and consultants. In order to guard 
against bias and reflect diverse perspectives, I conducted the semi-structured interviews at 
multiple sites in the southern, central, and northern regions of Mozambique (Maputo – southern 
region, Beira – central region, and Nampula – northern region) from May to October 2015, with 
the aim of obtaining a wide range of perspectives. On average, the interviews typically lasted 
between 45 minutes and one hour but sometimes up to two hours and covered a broad range of 
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issues depending on the respondent’s experience or expertise. Out of 91 participants, 63 were 
local actors. The remaining 28 consisted of international actors. 
Apart from conducting interviews, I also collected documentary and/or archival 
information in Mozambique. Archival resources are especially useful for case study construction 
as they are stable, broad, and exact (Yin, 2003). The bulk of this took place at the National 
Archive of Mozambique, in Maputo, and Eduardo Mondlane University, where I spent a few 
weeks reviewing thousands of valuable pages of unpublished documents. These documents 
provided a wealth of information about the processes and dynamics through which peacebuilding 
policies have been discussed, negotiated, and implemented by both local and external actors in 
Mozambique. 
Finally, in addition to interviews, archival research, and process tracing, this paper is also 
grounded in observation of non-participants and focus group discussions (FGDs). In analyzing the 
data, transcripts of interviews with local and external actors were coded in order to identify key 
themes and issues arising from the data. It became clear that the emergent analytic categories 
corresponded well with the three findings presented in the introduction, but I will limit my 
discussion in this paper to the role of the United Nations and the broader international community 
in Mozambican peacebuilding process. However, before diving into the discussion of the key 
findings, I first (briefly) provide the causes of civil war in Mozambique as a necessary first step in 
order to set the historical scene for ensuing discussions about the pathways to sustainable peace in 
Mozambique. 
The Causes of Civil War in Mozambique: External or Internal Causes? 
In 1977, just two years after independence from Portugal, Mozambique embarked on 
sixteen years of civil war that left the country economically damaged and politically fragile. The 
underlying causes of the civil war have been the subject of controversy and have tended to 
polarize around two opposing ideological positions. The first line of argument is that the war in 
Mozambique was an externally sponsored project of destabilization against the Frelimo led 
government in the context of the South African apartheid regime’s “total strategy” for the region, 
and conservative Western concern about a communist-inspired government providing an 
alternative development model for other African states (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983; Hanlon, 
1984; Fauvet, 1984). Here, the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) is 
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seen as a puppet force, set up and sustained by external support, with no real political program or 
intent to govern, and no domestic power base (Hanlon, 1984). 
The opposing argument is that the causes of the war in Mozambique were mainly 
internally driven. Particularly prominent among these researchers were Geffray (1988), Geffray 
and Pedersen (1988), Otto Roesch (1988, 1992), and Cahen, (1984). Their central argument was 
that uneven development between the northern and southern regions, exclusion of the northern 
elites from government, and more importantly, Frelimo Marxist-Leninist ideology and social 
policy initiatives played a major role in the onset and persistence of the conflict (Sitoe 2004; 
Sambanis, 2003; Cahen, 1998; Flower, 1997; Newitt, 1995; De Brito, 1991). 
In this paper, I take a step back from the polarizing debates about external and internal 
causes and focus centrally on their interactions. My argument is that both external and internal 
factors are complementary and do not substitute each other. Because at every point in 
Mozambique’s conflict, external actors played a crucial role—providing the means to mobilize 
domestic grievances, the resources to wage a protracted war, and the financial incentives to end 
the war (Weinstein & Francisco, 2005). Similarly, Frelimo’s policy errors during its radical 
socialist policy phase, and in particular, the secular zeal of the Frelimo government in 
disrespecting both the religious and traditional leaders, certainly contributed to the onset, 
duration, and the intensity of the war (Chan & Venancio, 1998). 
Legacies of the War 
By the end of the war in 1992, an estimated one million people (7 percent of the 
population) had died, five million others had been forcibly displaced, 60 percent of all primary 
schools and 31 percent of clinics had been destroyed, and the economic damage totaled $20 
billion (Adedokun, 2016; Miller & Ferris, 2015). The psychological impact of the war was even 
more devastating. Every Mozambican has probably lost a friend, relative, neighbor, or at least an 
acquaintance. Gehrke (1991) described the situation in Mozambique in the 1980s as one of the 
worst humanitarian crises in the world, while others have called it a holocaust. 
Peace Initiatives in Mozambique 
In light of the negative consequences of Mozambique’s war, several attempts at resolving 
the conflict and stabilizing the country were explored in the 1980s and 1990s. These included the 
1984 Nkomati Peace Talks, the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process, and the 1992 Rome General Peace 
Agreement. Though the Nkomati Peace Talks and the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process failed in all 
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senses to produce a durable peace, a sustainable negotiated treaty was reached in Rome, Italy, in 
1992. I will limit my analysis in this section to the Rome General Peace Agreement. 
Mozambique’s Transition from War to Peace: Rome General Peace Agreement as a Guide 
After the collapse of the Nairobi peace talks in 1989 as discussed above, representatives of 
Frelimo and Renamo finally met for a first round of direct negotiations and peace talks in Rome 
during the month of July in 1990. The Rome peace negotiations were hosted and mediated by the 
Italian government and the Roman Catholic Sant’ Egidio community, an Italian Catholic lay order 
and voluntary charitable organization, and were observed by Mozambique’s major donors, 
including the U.S, UK, Portugal, and Germany. After twelve rounds of peace talks, the General 
Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed on 4 October 1992 by Joachim Chissano, the President of 
Mozambique and leader of Frelimo, and by Afonso Dhlakama, the President of Renamo. The 
General Peace Agreement consisted of seven protocols designed to address both the formal 
resolution of Mozambique’s civil war, and the establishment of a new political system meant to 
provide the basis for lasting peace and political stability (Alden, 1995; Manning, 2002; Dobbins 
et.al., 2005). 
The Rome General Peace Agreement was only a guiding instrument to end the sixteen-
year war. How peace was eventually attained in Mozambique remains unanswered by most 
scholars (Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Nowak, 2010). Observers and theorists of the Mozambican 
peace process have long argued that Mozambique’s transition from war to peace lay in one of five 
reasons. First, a lengthy military stalemate made it clear to both Renamo and Frelimo that neither 
could win a decisive military victory (Lloyd, 1995, p.153). Second, external aid to both parties 
(both in terms of financial and technical support) had been significantly reduced. With the end of 
the Cold War, support for an ideological battle between Mozambique's Marxist-leaning 
government and the rebels disappeared, as did their sponsors (Walter, 1999, p.145; Berman, 1996, 
pp. 19-20). Third, a worsening drought threatened the country with mass starvation, making it 
increasingly difficult for both sides to feed their soldiers and supporters (Alden & Simpson, 1993, 
p.126; Ohlson, Stedman & Davies, 1994, pp. 113-116). Fourth, Mozambique was a “unique case” 
or it was simply that good fortunes guided the peace process (Hume, 1994). Similarly, other 
scholars have suggested that “hidden hands” had paid off the rebels and “bought” peace in 
Mozambique (Vines, 1998). Finally, a large number of studies based on a “liberal peace thesis” 
debunk existing studies and suggest that peace came to Mozambique as a singular result of the 
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heavy external intervention, and that without the intervention the same outcome would not have 
prevailed (Bekoe, 2008; Manning, 2002; Stedman, 1997). 
While the last explanation points in the right direction, I argue that it does not get to the 
heart of the matter, partly because: (a) it ignores the strategies and tools adopted by the 
international community to facilitate Mozambican peacebuilding process; (b) it focuses on 
Mozambique’s transition from war to peace, and does not capture the factors that sustain the 
transition. Therefore, while existing studies have offered useful analyses on the Mozambican 
peacebuilding trajectory, they have tended to overlook the most important causal mechanisms and 
processes employed by the UN and the international community. The next section provides a 
theoretical argument that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations 
increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs. Subsequent sections subject this argument 
to empirical testing. 
Theoretical Argument: Why Credible and Impartial International Support Through the UN 
Increases the Survival of Peace After Civil War 
Drawing from, and building upon, the established findings of peace scholars such as 
Caplan, Hoeffler, and Brinkman (2015), Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohne (2008), Doyle and Sambanis 
(2006), and Fortna (2008)—that external actors contribute to conflict resolution and post-war 
development—I also argue that external actors not only facilitate the transition from war to peace, 
but also contribute to the sustainability of peace after the transition. This argument raises an 
important question: why are external actors critical to the sustainability of peace after war? The 
bargaining model of war tells us that there are three main sources of problems for states emerging 
from civil war. The first difficulty is information asymmetry (Slantchev, 2003). The second 
source of problems as to why peace could break down in the absence of external actors relates to 
issues of indivisibility of stakes in the conflict (Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2003). The third challenge 
for states emerging from war is a commitment problem (Walter, 1997; 2009; Fearon, 1995). 
This begs the question: how can external actors contribute to effective conflict resolution 
and the sustainability of peace after war? The existing literature presents several arguments to 
address this question. First, external actors can escalate the costs among the warring parties for 
reigniting war. Second, since bargaining theory suggests that war is a result of misperceptions and 
an inability to effectively transmit credible information, a third party can facilitate the transfer of 
information among the combatants. Third, external actors can “shame” belligerents into ceasing 
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violence and accept a peace agreement and/or tenable compromise (see Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; 
Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2008; Osborn, 2013). Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, a third 
party/external actor can also use its peacebuilding operations’ tools to overcome the credible 
commitment problem. Budget support or foreign aid, DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance 
schemes, for example, are designed to enforce the terms of peace agreements and thus build trust 
for former combatant groups that the peace will endure. 
However, not all external peacebuilders or third parties will serve these purposes 
adequately. Essentially, external peacebuilders fall into two groups: unilateral and multilateral 
peacebuilders. In the context of this study, multilateral peacebuilding means an UN-authorized 
mission that reflects a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council: 
China, France, Russia, the U.S., and United Kingdom (UK). By contrast, if a state engages in 
peacebuilding mission without the UN authorization, the action is defined as unilateral 
peacebuilding. Examples of unilateral peacebuilding missions thus include cases when a state 
engages in peacebuilding operations along with its allies without authorization from the UN. 
Here, I argue that a unilateral peacebuilding mission is likely to impede the development 
of war-torn states and also reduce sustainable peace. Unilateral peacebuilders often intend to 
expand influence on target states, thereby ensuring their own security interests and gaining 
political and economic benefits (Autesserre, 2010; Dobbins et al., 2005; Sambanis & Schulhofer-
Wohl, 2005; Waltz, 1979; Levi, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). However, unlike 
unilateral peacebuilding missions that often support one side of the belligerents and attempt to 
alter the balance of power for strategic interests, including the maintenance of regional influence, 
the expansion of markets as well as access to natural resources (Morgenthau, 1967; Regan, 2002; 
Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006), multilateral peacebuilding missions under the auspices of 
the UN contribute to negotiated settlement by helping ensure that the current power distribution 
remains static (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Regan, 2000). Hence, multilateral 
peacebuilding missions do not intend to benefit or disadvantage a particular group (Barnett & 
Weiss, 2008), and thus do not face national resistance. According to Finnemore (2003), “peace-
building operation must be multilateral to be legitimate and indeed successful; without 
multilateralism, claims of humanitarian or peacebuilding motivation and justification are suspect” 
(p. 73). 
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There are three main reasons why multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN 
should contribute to sustainable peace compared to unilateral peacebuilding missions. First, the 
UN with high moral authority and international legitimacy can incentivize civil war combatants to 
cooperate for disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) by affecting soldiers’ 
morale, focusing international attention on non-cooperative groups, and providing direct benefits 
for cooperation (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). DDR strategy enables a post-war 
country to divert both material and human resources allocated to military uses to important and 
urgent social programs, such as the improvement of education, access to public health services, 
and decent infrastructure. In this way, it can be argued that a multilateral peacebuilding under the 
leadership of the UN contributes to the increase of resources available for post-war reconstruction 
by helping resource diversion and thereby facilitating sustainable peace after war. 
Second, given their commitment to humanitarian concerns, multilateral peacebuilding 
missions through the UN often accompany humanitarian and development aid, which 
invariably increase resources available for post-war development. Besides DDR, UN peace 
operations can include large-scale development efforts to assist in post-war reconstruction, such 
as refugee resettlement programs, demining initiatives, the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of 
roads, schools, health facilities, and food aid (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Howard, 2008). Such 
UN-led programs and activities can contribute to citizens’ well-being and post-conflict peace and 
stability. Third, and finally, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN can encourage 
sharing of costs for post-war reconstruction; for which the fixed burden-sharing mechanism of the 
UN provides an institutional solution that reduces the risks of bargaining failures, decreases 
transaction costs, and alleviates the problem of free riders (Kim, 2013). 
Multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN are not without criticism, however 
(see, Dobbins et. al., 2007; MacGinty, 2008; Richmond, 2009, 2010; Newman, Paris, & 
Richmond, 2009). The UN attempts to change political and economic systems of post-war states 
can undermine a government’s sovereignty and accountability (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Richmond, 
2011). However, in civil war affected societies, international assistance may matter more than 
sovereignty for physical well-being of citizens at least temporarily, as long as it is not motivated 
by the unilateral peacebuilders’ self-interest, but by multilateral peacebuilding missions through 
the UN, which are largely driven by humanitarian and development concerns (Doyle & Sambanis 
2006). 
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Translating these arguments to the post-conflict peacebuilding context, we can infer that 
an external peacebuilding mission will be most successful when it is led and/or authorized by the 
UN (employing instruments such as DDR, humanitarian and relief efforts, political assistance, 
and budget support), rather than a unilateral peacebuilding mission led by the United States or 
Russia. These conditions were all met in Mozambique, primarily because of the partnership 
between the United Nations, regional actors and the presence of a large and varied network of 
experienced and committed donors. The following section empirically shows that Mozambique’s 
successful transition from war to peace is a product of multilateral peacebuilding through the 
United Nations, and not unilateral. 
How the UN and the Broader International Community Contributed  
to Sustainable Peace in Mozambique 
Having outlined theoretically the importance and positive effects of international 
community to sustainable peace under the auspices of the UN in the previous section, the analysis 
now turns to empirical material from Mozambique. As Ball and Barnes (2000) pointed out, 
bilateral donors, as well as NGOS, created several forums, both formal and informal, to 
coordinate assistance for peace implementation in Mozambique (pp. 16-17). More importantly, 
the Security Council Resolution 797 established the United Nation Operations in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) in December 1992 to help implement the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 
October 1992 by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo. 
Although the United Nations Operations mandate’s in Mozambique formally came to an end on 9 
December 1994, the UN is still present in Mozambique today and continues to influence the 
country’s post-war peace in four ways: (1) Security/DDR assistance, (2) Humanitarian assistance, 
(3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Below, I explore each of these 
strategies one after the other. 
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (1): Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
The UN, together with a committed group of bilateral donors, played a vital role in 
advancing and promoting peace and security in Mozambique. The DDR component of the UN 
strategy in Mozambique was unique in two ways. First, The UN provided specialized counselling 
and vocation training to ex-combatants based on their needs. Second, unlike in the cases of 
Angola and South Sudan, where the UN conducted elections before demobilization, the UN 
prioritized in the case of Mozambique the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants 
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before the first election was conducted in 1994. Significantly, ONUMOZ and donor agencies 
helped to establish a new Mozambican Defense Force—consisting of both the government and 
the opposition. According to many interview participants, “military inclusion gives feelings of 
physical security and confidence to the opposition” (Interviewees No. 11, 17, 21, and 26).   
Although the overall progress of the DDR and the security sector reform including the 
professionalism of the military is still an important policy issue in Mozambique to-date, some 
success has been made. ONUMOZ, with the help of UN-OCHA and other UN agencies and 
donors, was able to demobilize and reintegrate about 100,000 combatants from both sides. 
Seventy percent of demobilized soldiers who received training ended up with secure employment 
after the departure from the camps (Morgan & Mvududu, 2000, p. 16). Several years after the 
Peace Agreement, demobilized soldiers had been well integrated into the communities of their 
choice (Kane, 1998). ONUMOZ collected more than 200,000 weapons and gave them to the 
newly formed Mozambican Defense Force. The United Nations also helped establish a National 
Mine Clearance Plan to clear an initial 4,000 kilometers of roads, develop a mine awareness 
program, and educate the population on the dangers of land mines. 
Similarly, reduction of military expenditure has been realized. Before 1994, defense 
spending was the largest single item in the annual budget expenditure. With UN and donors 
support, however, resources have been shifted towards social sectors. For instance, from 1994 to 
2014 budgets, the education and health ministries benefited from significant increases in both 
capital and recurrent allocations while funds for the military and other security agencies were cut 
down. The trend continued in the 2015 budget (see table 2 below). 
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (2): Humanitarian Assistance 
The UN system and development donors also championed humanitarian and relief efforts 
in Mozambique. One unique aspect of a broader UN approach to humanitarian assistance program 
in Mozambique was UNOCHA’s decentralized administrative structure that was replicated at 
both national and provincial levels. This initiative led to the introduction of emergency assistance 
in all eleven provinces and helped manage the long-term elements of the demobilization process 
(Interviewee no. 65). Representatives from the Government, Renamo, and several Western 
powers, as well as South Africa, organized the various aspects of the assistance program. 
UNOCHA's central office in Maputo provided overall coordination of the humanitarian efforts. 
An information and Referral Service and Reintegration Support Scheme were set up to inform ex-
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combatants about available support and employment opportunities and to provide them with 
financial assistance for 24 months. According to many interview participants: 
The decentralization of the UN approach to humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial 
and district levels made Mozambique humanitarian assistance the most successful ever 
undertaken by the United Nations. Within two years after the peace agreement, over 1.7 
million refugees returned to their homeland. (Interviewees No. 1, 5, 17, & 75)  
Similarly, more than 4.5 million internally displaced Mozambicans are believed to have returned 
home during the same period (UNHCR, 1998). According to a UN respondent:  
The underlying rationale for humanitarian assistance is that if humanitarian capacity 
building is well implemented, it can build resilience at the community level; assist 
national actors in developing the ability to cope with current and future crisis; and more 
importantly, it can contribute to a more sustainable peace without compromising the 
principles of humanitarian assistance which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and 
independence. (Interviewee no. 75). 
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (3): Political Party Development and Electoral Assistance 
Recognizing that political participation is a critical component of peace and stability, the 
UN provided financial support directly for the transformation of Renamo, the rebel group, into a 
political party. The UN created two trust funds in order to: (1) support all registered political 
parties (17 parties received U.S. $150,000 each), and (2) support the transformation of Renamo 
into a political party. It is worth mentioning that Mozambique was one of the “litmus tests” in 
which the UN provided financial support directly for the development of political parties 
(Manning & Malbrough, 2009). This was considered a major landmark of the Mozambican peace 
process.  
Although the UN spearheaded the “money for peace” initiative, thirteen bilateral donors, 
including the European Commission, largely funded it. For example, Italy made the largest 
contribution, over $11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a 
combined total of over $1.96 million to Renamo’s trust fund, with the Netherlands the fourth 
largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States (Manning & Malbrough, 
2009).  
According to Aldo Ajello (1999 p.123), chief of the UN mission and the Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General to Mozambique:  
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The Trust Fund played a crucial role for the success of the mission […] the two parties 
needed to have enough political and economic capital to dissuade them from returning to 
war […] that the peace would only prevail if both parties felt that it was beneficial for 
their interests […] in this operation it was also important to give particular attention to 
Renamo which, at the beginning, had nothing to lose. (as cited in Nuvunga, 2007, p.11) 
As a UN interview participant noted: “The existence of viable opposition parties is an essential 
instrument to the success of the peace process, and money is key” (Interviewee no.11). The 
Renamo’s Chief negotiator, Raul Domingos, summed it up in a statement on 16 June 1992: “there 
is no democracy without money” (Vine, 1996, p. 144). 
Following the development of political parties, the UN, in conjunction with development 
donors, established an independent national electoral commission (CNE) (Interviewees no. 2; 4; 
6, & 19). The first national elections in Mozambique were held in October 1994. The incumbent 
President, Mr. Chissano, won the presidential election with 53.3 percent of the votes. The leader 
of Renamo, Mr. Dhlakama, received 33.7 percent of the votes. The candidate receiving the third 
largest number of votes (2.9 percent) was Mr. Wehia Ripua of the Partido Democrático de 
Moçambique (Pademo). Both local and international observers judged the Mozambique elections 
of 1994 as free and fair. Since the transitional multi-party elections were held in 1994, the 
democratic process has been consolidated by four subsequently national elections (1999, 2004, 
2009, and 2014). Frelimo has won a majority in parliament and the presidency in each of the 
general elections (see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1.  Mozambican Elections, 1994 –2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Azevedo-Harman (2015) 
 
The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (4): Budget Support 
Alongside the use of DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance, the UN and donor 
agencies also employed budget support as a strategy to sustain peace and development in 
Mozambique. Since the peace settlement in 1992, Mozambique has been recognized as one of the 
largest recipients of direct budget support in the world. Budget support accounts for 30 percent of 
the Mozambican state budget, provided by nineteen development partners (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015). In the table below, for example, budget support increased almost three-
fold between 2004 to 2012: from just under $160 million to about $450 million.
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Table 1: Budget Support Disbursements by Development Partners, 2004-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Direccão Nacional do Tesouro – Ministry of Finance (2012). 
 
By definition budget support is the provision of aid directly to the state budget. Budget 
support for sustainable peacebuilding is grounded in National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Document (known by its Portuguese acronym PARPA). The PARPA is a five-year program and 
is jointly prepared by the Government of Mozambique, development partners, and CSOs. The 
PARPA has four main objectives that are considered critical to achieve sustainable 
peacebuilding: (a) rural and agricultural development; (b) poverty and macroeconomic 
management; (c) governance; and (d) human and social development, especially health and 
education. 
Through budget support, total spending on the priority sectors designated in PARPA has 
more than quadrupled in nominal terms between 2004 and 2012, increasing by more than 7 
percentage points of GDP (see table below). Similarly, as a percentage of total expenditure, 
education, health, agriculture, good governance, and infrastructure, together with the other 
smaller priority sectors, have increased their share from 61 percent to just over 67 percent of 
total spending. The bottom line here is that: budgetary allocations—boosted by Budget Support 
disbursements—have been consistent with the planned expansion of priority sectors outlined in 
PARP (see table 2).  
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Table 2: Influence of Budget Support on Sectors Relevant to Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance & Fiscal tables from the Bank of Mozambique (for years 2005-2011)                        
and *IMF Article IV estimates (2012) 
 
How successful has budget support been in contributing to sustainable peacebuilding in 
Mozambique? Although the answer to this question is not straightforward, there is evidence of 
remarkable and track-able progress in education, health, and good governance—all of which 
imply predictors of stable societies. Consider education for example: between 1980 and 2014, 
Mozambique’s human development score increased 75 percent, or an average annual increase of 
about 1.66 percent—a better performance than Zimbabwe or Angola, two countries in the region 
that had a similar score to Mozambique in 1980. This performance has been driven by a jump in 
life expectancy at birth, rising from 46 years in 1995 to 55 in 2014, and a leap in income per 
capita, from $233 in 1995 to $585 in 2014 (constant 2011 U.S. dollars, purchasing power parity) 
(World Bank, 2016). The UNDP Education Index, which reflects both literacy and enrollment, 
also shows an improvement between 1995 and 2011 (UNDP Report, 2014): in 2011, 90 percent 
of school-aged children were enrolled in basic education, which is a significant improvement 
from the rate of 56 percent in 1995. Similarly, the secondary school net enrollment rate (NER) 
more than doubled from 8.2 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 2009. In terms of provincial trends, 
progress was made across all provinces both in primary and secondary enrolment, thereby 
reducing regional educational inequality (see figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2.  Net Enrolment Rates (NER), Primary and Secondary Schooling by Region 2002/03 
and 2008/09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Source: Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2015 
 
There are several reasons why education improvements, for example, should contribute 
to sustainable peacebuilding. First, according to a World Bank report (Aoki et al., 2002), 
government investment in education is a means by which governments can make a direct and 
lasting positive impact on people’s lives, which may directly reduce the level of grievances in 
society. Second, the expansion of public spending in education can reduce grievances and 
conflict by spurring economic development and social equality (Thyne, 2006). According to 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), rebel recruitment costs more and rebellion is less likely the higher 
the level of education in a society. Third, education promotes a culture of peace (Sargent, 1996). 
As Lipset (1959) pointed out: “Education presumably broadens men’s outlook, enables them to 
understand the needs for norms of tolerance, restraining them from adhering to extremist and 
monistic doctrines” (p. 79). In line with this, several scholars hold that higher educational 
attainment reduces the risk of political violence by encouraging political participation and 
channeling conflicts of interest through institutional pathways rather than through the use of 
violence (e.g., Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003; Huntington, 1968). More recently, 
education has also been argued (especially primary and secondary education) to promote social 
cohesion, such as learning how to work together peacefully, which in turn enables peace and 
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political stability (Smith, 2010). Thus, the case of Mozambique shows that generous budget 
support, especially when it is rightly targeted, can help to consolidate the peace process. 
Conclusion 
Although a combination of factors was responsible for the emergence and survival of 
peace and stability in Mozambique, this paper has argued that one of the most important factors 
behind Mozambique’s success was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of the United 
Nations, Western powers, and major donors, who were committed to making peace work and 
had long-standing relationships with the both Frelimo and Renamo. The paper further shows that 
any assessment of the UN and the broader international community’s role and performance in 
support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four 
intervention strategies or instruments, namely: (1) DDR assistance, (2) humanitarian assistance, 
(3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Overall, the Mozambican case 
reinforces many of the findings from the literature on the role of third-party guarantors in 
securing negotiated peace settlements. Specifically, it provides insight into the argument that 
external peacebuilding led by the UN is more likely to be successful than a unilateral 
peacebuilding by a powerful state without UN approval. 
But, while it is perhaps difficult to overstate the importance and the positive contributions 
of the UN and the broader international community in the promotion of peace and democracy in 
Mozambique, it is also noteworthy to point out that development donors often have their own 
agendas that are not suitable or in the interests of the local people. In the case of Mozambique, 
however, the efforts and agendas of the development donors were moderated by the involvement 
of “local actors.” Here, the first key actors include the Christian Council of Mozambique, which 
consists of the Catholic, Anglican and Protestant churches, with the constant support of the 
community of Sant’ Egidio, an Italian Catholic NGO, which enjoyed the confidence of both the 
government and Renamo. Finally, there is also evidence that the avoidance of post-conflict 
relapse in Mozambique since 1992 can also be traced to the continued existence of “inclusive 
political settlement.” 
While much progress has been achieved in building a more peaceful polity in 
Mozambique through the United Nations and the broader international community, there are also 
challenges. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that signs of peace and progress 
notwithstanding, Mozambique still faces a large number of social and economic problems: 
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poverty, unemployment, natural resource boom, increasing political exclusion, dependence on 
foreign aid, and low access to social and economic services and facilities. Of course, this is not to 
dismiss Mozambique’s achievements, but rather to demonstrate that post-conflict peacebuilding 
is contentious, haphazard, and non-linear process. For this reason, Mozambican stakeholders and 
their international counterparts should consider prioritizing inclusive institutions and promoting 
economic development in order for Mozambique to continue to be a model of sustainable peace 
after civil war. 
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